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BASIC RESEARCH ARTICLE
The role of guilt in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Konstantin Bub and Miriam J. J. Lommen
Clinical Psychology and Experimental Psychopathology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Background: A growing body of evidence supports the notion that the emotional profile of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may be more diverse than traditional accounts presume.
PTSD’s image as an anxiety-based disorder is undergoing change as the significance of other
emotions in its development becomes more evident. Experimental research is needed in order
to expand the understanding of underlying processes driving the development of PTSD.
Objective: Experimentally test the influence of stressor-related guilt on the occurrence of
PTSD symptomatology.
Method: A non-clinical student sample faced an analogue trauma, a stressor in the form of a
computer crash and related loss of data. We either personally blamed participants for
causing the incident (blame group) or told them that it was a technical failure and therefore
not their fault (no-blame group). Levels of guilt before and after the incident as well as
number and associated distress of incident-related intrusions were assessed using a one-day
diary and compared between groups.
Results: The guilt manipulation was successful: feelings of guilt significantly increased in the
blame group but not in the no-blame group. Furthermore, the blame group showed a
significantly higher number of intrusions and associated distress compared to the no-blame
group at one-day follow-up.
Conclusions: These laboratory findings indicate that feelings of guilt may lead to increased
PTSD symptomatology, supporting the view that guilt experienced in reaction to a traumatic
event may be part of a causal mechanism driving the development of PTSD.
El papel de la culpa en el trastorno de estrés postraumático
Planteamiento: Un creciente conjunto de evidencias apoya la noción de que el perfil
emocional del Trastorno por Estrés Postraumático (TEPT) puede ser más diverso de lo que
suponen las consideraciones tradicionales. La imagen del TEPT como un trastorno basado
en la ansiedad está experimentando cambios a medida que se hace más evidente la
importancia de otras emociones en su desarrollo. Se necesita investigación experimental
para ampliar la comprensión de los procesos subyacentes que fomentan el desarrollo del
trastorno por estrés postraumático.
Objetivo: Probar experimentalmente la influencia de la culpa relacionada con el factor de
estrés en la ocurrencia de la sintomatología del TEPT.
Método: Una muestra no clínica de estudiantes se enfrentó a un trauma análogo, que es un
factor de estrés en forma de fallo informático y la consiguiente pérdida de datos. O bien
culpamos personalmente a los participantes por causar el incidente (culpan al grupo) o les
dijimos que se trataba de un fallo técnico y, por lo tanto, no era su culpa (no culpan al
grupo). Se evaluaron los niveles de culpabilidad antes y después del incidente, así como la
cantidad de intrusiones relacionadas con el incidente y la angustia asociada usando un
diario de 1 día y se compararon entre ambos grupos.
Resultados: La manipulación de la culpa tuvo éxito, ya que los sentimientos de culpa aumen-
taron significativamente en el grupo al que se culpó, pero no en el grupo al que no se culpó.
Además, el grupo de la culpa mostró un número significativamente mayor de intrusiones y de
angustia asociada en comparación con el grupo sin culpa en el seguimiento 1 día después.
Conclusiones: Estos hallazgos de laboratorio indican que los sentimientos de culpa pueden
conducir a una mayor sintomatología del TEPT, lo que respalda la opinión de que la culpa
experimentada en reacción a un evento traumático puede ser parte de un mecanismo
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HIGHLIGHTS
• Short-term feelings of guilt
following an analogue
trauma or stressor in the
laboratory can be induced in
healthy participants.
• Feelings of guilt as a
reaction to a stressor were




• Feelings of guilt may
contribute to the
development of PTSD
symptoms such as intrusive
thoughts.
• This study supports the
potential importance of
attending to feelings of guilt
in PTSD, besides feelings of
anxiety.
CONTACT Miriam J. J. Lommen M.J.J.Lommen@rug.nl Department of Clinical Psychology and Experimental Psychopathology, University of
Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/1, 9712 TS Groningen, The Netherlands
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY, 2017
VOL. 8, 1407202
https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2017.1407202
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits







In recent years a process of rethinking has occurred
in the research on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD). A growing body of evidence now indicates
that, contrary to traditional accounts, PTSD may not
primarily be an anxiety-based disorder. Instead, a
wide range of other emotions accompanies PTSD
and may be central to its development and mainte-
nance (Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001; Power & Fyvie,
2012). Accordingly, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013) changed its classifica-
tion of PTSD from anxiety-related disorder to
trauma- and stressor-related disorder and added
anger, guilt, and shame alongside fear as significant
emotional responses to trauma.
The emotion of guilt in particular has been con-
sistently linked to the development and maintenance
of PTSD symptomatology (Kubany & Watson, 2003;
Lee et al., 2001; Wilson, Drozdek, & Turkovic, 2006).
Using a self-report measure, Henning and Frueh
(1997) found severity of combat-related guilt in veter-
ans to be positively correlated with re-experiencing
and avoidance symptoms of PTSD, as well as with a
general measure of PTSD severity. Another study by
Beck et al. (2011) found guilt-related distress and
cognitions to be positively associated with PTSD
severity in a cross-sectional study with women
experiencing intimate partner violence. Despite
sound evidence for a guilt-PTSD link, the exact nat-
ure of the relationship remains evasive and in press-
ing need of further clarification. Pugh, Taylor, and
Berry (2015) presented four putative models of the
association between guilt and PTSD: (1) trauma-
related guilt plays a causal role in the development
of PTSD symptomatology; (2) PTSD symptomatology
plays a causal role in the development of guilt; (3)
guilt and PTSD symptomatology are both products of
a traumatic event, occurring alongside rather than
causing one another; and (4) concepts closely related
to guilt such as shame mediate the trauma-PTSD link
and this process overlaps with guilt. Due to a lack of
longitudinal and experimental research, supporting
evidence for the respective models is scarce and cau-
sation and directionality of the guilt-PTSD relation-
ship remain to be investigated (Pugh et al., 2015).
The present study aims to address this gap in
empirical findings by experimentally assessing the
first of the four putative models, which describes
trauma-related guilt as part of a causal psychological
mechanism driving the development of PTSD symp-
tomatology. We thereby hope to clarify basic under-
lying principles of the guilt–PTSD relationship in
order to advance the understanding of emotional
factors influencing the development of the disorder.
Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, and Felton (2010) define
guilt as involving ‘moral transgressions (real or ima-
gined) in which people believe that their action (or
inaction) contributed to negative outcomes’ (p. 546).
Guilt is seen as the self’s negative evaluation of spe-
cific behaviours and thereby differs from the related
concept of shame, where the entire self is negatively
evaluated in a more stable manner (Lewis, 1971). This
article will focus on the concept of guilt as defined by
Tilghman-Osborne et al. (2010). In relation to trau-
matic events, this definition fits within the clinical
model of guilt-based PTSD proposed by Lee et al.
(2001). This model states that evaluation of the per-
sonal meaning of a traumatic event by the individual
may crucially influence the development of PTSD.
Four cognitive determinants of guilt related to perso-
nal involvement in traumatic events are frequently
identified in traumatized patients (Kubany &
Manke, 1995): (a) violation of personal standards of
right and wrong; (b) perceived responsibility and
preventability of the event; (c) perceived lack of jus-
tification for actions taken; and (d) false believes
about pre-outcome knowledge and hindsight bias.
Hereby, feelings of guilt are closely related to pre-
trauma schemas patients have of themselves and
others. Trauma-related information is matched to
these schematic representations and both congruence
and incongruence between trauma-related informa-
tion and self-schemas can form the basis of intrusive
activity as observed in PTSD patients. In the case of
schema congruence, a traumatic event can lead to the
activation or confirmation of underlying, guilt-asso-
ciated beliefs about the self. These schemas then
become the dominant mode of reasoning for the
individual, causing him or her to understand the
traumatic event from the perspective of the maladap-
tive schema. Guilt-charged intrusive recollections of
the event resulting from this are linked to pervasive
feelings of guilt and the occurrence of avoidance
behaviours and rumination. In the case of schema
incongruence, the traumatic event does not fit with
underlying beliefs about the self. Beliefs about the self
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are not altered and therefore feelings of guilt are
limited to the event-related memory (circumscribed
guilt). Still, a feeling of violation of personal stan-
dards or responsibility may cause individuals to
experience guilt-based intrusions that are character-
ized by replaying what happened in order to find
indications when and how the individual could have
acted differently to prevent the traumatic event
(ruminative replay; Lee et al., 2001).
The putative model that is the subject of inves-
tigation in the current study fits within this clinical
framework of guilt-based PTSD by describing guilt
as part of the causal mechanism that drives the
development of the disorder (Pugh et al., 2015).
According to the model, a traumatic event can
cause individuals to experience severe feelings of
guilt, the degree of which depends on the perceived
personal involvement. The evaluation of personal
involvement may be influenced by factors such as
perceived wrongdoing, responsibility, and self-
blame (Foa & Rothbaum, 1999; Kubany et al.,
1996). Feelings of guilt, in turn, may form the
basis of trauma-related intrusions typical of PTSD
symptomatology (Lee et al., 2001). Thus, this model
proposes guilt to function as a meditational process
underlying the development of PTSD following a
traumatic experience.
As previously discussed, cross-sectional designs
are not suited to determine causation and direc-
tionality of effects. In order to draw firmer conclu-
sions about the nature of the guilt-PTSD link and
to test whether the putative model presented by
Pugh et al. (2015) is appropriate, experimental
research can be used. Experimentally manipulating
aversive states like guilt causes ethical issues, thus a
non-clinical analogue population can be suitable
for investigating basic psychological principles
underlying the guilt-PTSD relationship. In addition
to providing theoretical insights into non-anxiety
factors that influence the development of PTSD,
such research can have important implications for
clinical practice, since enhanced understanding of
the emotional profile underlying the disorder can
help tailor interventions specifically to the needs of
patients suffering from guilt-based PTSD (Dalgleish
& Power, 2004; Power & Fyvie, 2012; Stapleton,
Taylor, & Asmundson, 2006).
Even though research indicates a relationship
between the emotion of guilt and the development
of PTSD, the direction of this link remains to be
established. The current study investigates, in an
experimental setting, whether short-term feelings of
guilt, induced as a reaction to an analogue trauma or
stressor, can lead to PTSD-like phenomena such as
intrusive thoughts at a non-clinical level. We thereby
hypothesize that participants who are personally
blamed for causing a computer crash and a related
loss of data show an increased occurrence of intru-
sions and higher associated distress on the day of the




A total of 51 first-year students (24 male, 27 female)
from a Dutch university’s psychology programme
participated in the study in exchange for course
credit. The results of 11 participants were later
excluded because they became suspicious of the
deception that was used during the study. One parti-
cipant was not taken into account for analyses since
he did not complete the study due to high levels of
distress experienced in reaction to the manipulation.
1.2. Measures
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item self-
report measure to rate positive and negative affect
experienced in the present moment. Each item is
rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly
or not at all) to 5 (extremely) and the measure
includes a guilt-item. Cronbach’s alpha was .88 in
the current sample.
Intrusions and their characteristics were measured
using an intrusion diary. The diary consists of ques-
tions to assess the number (‘How often did anything
about the participation pop up spontaneously in your
mind?’) and quality (‘Specify pop-up as thought,
image, or feeling and give a short description of its
content’) of intrusions experienced after participa-
tion, as well as the distress (‘How much were you
bothered by the pop-up?’) caused by them. Distress of
the pop-ups is rated on a 10-point scale ranging from
1 (not bothered at all) to 10 (extremely bothered).
The Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI;
Kubany et al., 1996) is a 32-item self-report measure
assessing guilt experienced in relation to a specific
traumatic event. Items are scored on a 5-point scale
ranging from 4 (extremely true) to 0 (not at all true)
and the measure includes three scales: (a) a four-item
Global Guilt scale, measuring the magnitude of guilt
experienced after a traumatic event; (b) a six-item
Distress scale, measuring physical distress specifically
related to the trauma memory; and (c) a 22-item
Guilt Cognitions scale, measuring participants’ beliefs
that their thoughts, feelings, or actions have violated
personal and/or moral standards of behaviour.
Cronbach’s alpha was .80 in the current sample.
The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ;
Ehring et al., 2011) is a 15-item self-report measure
assessing participants’ general tendency to engage in
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repetitive negative thinking as a reaction to negative
experiences or problems. Items are scored on a 5-
point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (almost
always). Cronbach’s alpha was .94 in the current
sample.
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Revised
(EPQ-R; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) is a
self-report personality measure to assess the person-
ality dimensions of Psychoticism, Extraversion, and
Neuroticism. For this study, participants completed
the Neuroticism scale (22 yes/no items), which places
participants along the emotionally stable–emotionally
unstable continuum based on the number of items
they mark with yes. Cronbach’s alpha was .79 in the
current sample.
The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) is a 28-item self-
report measure to assess strategies adopted to cope
with stressful events in general. The questionnaire
includes a self-blame subscale, consisting of two
items that are scored on a 4-point scale ranging
from 1 (I usually don’t do this at all) to 4 (I usually
do this a lot). Cronbach’s alpha was .75 in the current
sample.
1.3. Procedure
The experimental design included exposure to a com-
puter crash and the subsequent (acted) distress of the
researcher related to the loss of data. The design
included two conditions: (1) blame (experimental
condition), participants were personally blamed for
causing the computer crash and the related loss of
data; (2) no-blame (control condition), participants
were explicitly told that the computer crash and the
related loss of data were caused by technical failure
and therefore not their fault. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two conditions upon
arrival in the laboratory. Thus, there was one
between-subjects factor (blame vs. no-blame) as the
independent variable. Reported number of intrusions
and associated distress experienced by the partici-
pants were the dependent variables, which were
assessed with the diary.
After arriving in the laboratory, participants were
provided with an information sheet about the study
and gave written consent for their participation.
Participants were told that the study consisted of
two parts, which were to be completed during two
appointments, taking place on two consecutive days.
Both parts belonged to the cover story, whereby par-
ticipants were made to believe that Part 1 assessed
changes in attitudes towards sustainable behaviour
and Part 2 investigated the influence of different key-
board setups on typing performance. Participants
completed a set of pre-manipulation measures,
including the EPQ-R (Neuroticism), Brief COPE,
PTQ, and PANAS. To increase credibility of the
cover story, participants also completed a brief ques-
tionnaire on typing abilities. In addition, participants
were instructed to complete the diary at home before
going to bed on the day of the first appointment.
Next, participants watched a brief video about a sus-
tainability campaign after which Part 1 of the study
was finished.
For Part 2, participants were introduced to the
typing task. The computer task was based on a
study by Horselenberg, Merckelback, and Josephs
(2003), who used a similar setup to investigate the
influence of false incriminating evidence on partici-
pants’ willingness to make false confessions. E-Prime
2.0 Professional was used to create the computer task.
Stimuli appeared in lower case, black letters against a
white background. Participants were informed that
the task was designed to investigate the influence of
different keyboard setups on typing speed and accu-
racy. All participants were told that they were
assigned to the control group and, therefore, had to
complete the task on a regular keyboard. The task
consisted of typing five-letter combinations that
appeared on the screen. It was stressed that partici-
pants should focus on typing as quickly and accu-
rately as possible since their response time was
recorded but that they should not press the SHIFT-
key, because pressing that key may cause the compu-
ter to crash and data to be lost. To make the possi-
bility of an inadvertent pressing of the SHIFT-key
more plausible, the letters Q, A, and Z (all located
close to the shift key) were presented in an increased
frequency during the task. A total of 96 stimuli were
presented before the computer crashed.
After the computer crash, the researcher either
personally blamed the participants for pressing the
shift key and thus causing the crash and the related
loss of data (blame group), or told the participants
that the crash was caused by technical failure and not
the participants’ fault (no-blame group). Both groups
experienced the stressor, which can be seen as an
analogue trauma, of witnessing the researcher’s des-
pair and helplessness following the incident and,
except for holding the blame group responsible for
causing the crash, both groups were treated identi-
cally by the researcher. To make participants in the
blame group believe that they pressed the shift key,
false incriminating evidence was presented (see
Horselenberg et al., 2003) by telling participants that
their responses, including pressing the shift key on
trial 96, were visible on the researcher’s own compu-
ter screen. To evoke feelings of guilt in the blame
group while avoiding defensive reactions by partici-
pants, emphasis was put on the researcher’s devasta-
tion in the face of the crash and loss of data.
Participants were then asked to complete the
PANAS for a second time (post-manipulation mea-
sure) after which the first appointment was finished.
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Before leaving the laboratory, participants were
reminded to complete the diary before going to bed
and were asked not to discuss the incident with their
colleagues in order to keep future participants from
learning about the deception.
Upon returning for the second appointment a day
later, participants were asked to complete the follow-
up measures, consisting of a third PANAS and the
TRGI. After participants finished completing the
questionnaires, they were fully debriefed, which
included explaining the deceptive nature of the
study and reminding participants not to discuss the
study with their colleagues. The study has been
approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology of
the University of Groningen.
2. Results
2.1. Pre-manipulation measures
Final analyses included 39 participants, with 19 par-
ticipants in the blame group (10 male, nine female)
and 20 participants in the no-blame group (eight
male, 12 female). To test whether groups differed
with regard to certain personality characteristics and
their general tendencies of reacting to stressful events
and problems, participants completed a set of pre-
manipulation measures, including the EPQ-R
(Neuroticism), Brief COPE, and PTQ. Independent
t-tests were performed to compare mean scores for
the measures between the blame group and the no-
blame group. Results showed no significant differ-
ences between groups for any of these three pre-
manipulation measures (see Table 1).
2.2. Manipulation check for guilt
Figure 1 shows mean levels of guilt for both groups,
as assessed with the PANAS guilt-item over time, for
three points of measurement (pre-manipulation,
post-manipulation, and follow-up). Since the aim of
the current study was to investigate the influence of
short-term induced guilt on intrusions, analyses were
focused on pre-manipulation and post-manipulation
guilt scores.
Purpose of the manipulation was to induce feelings of
guilt in the blame group, so to test whether the manip-
ulation was successful, a 2 (Group; blame, no-blame) x 2
(Time; pre-manipulation, post-manipulation) repeated
measures ANOVA was performed. Results showed a
significant main effect of Group, F(1,37) = 23.00,
p < .001, η2= .38 and a significant main effect of Time,
F(1,37) = 23.77, p < .001, η2= .39. Also, the Group * Time
interaction was significant, F(1,37) = 14.09, p < .001,
η2.28. Analyses of simple main effects revealed that
there was no significant difference in guilt between the
blame group (M = 1.52) and the no-blame group
(M = 1.15) for the pre-manipulation measure,
Table 1. Comparison of group means for pre-manipulation and follow-up measures.
Blame No-blame
Time Measure M (SD) M (SD) df t p
Pre-manipulation EPQ-R (N) 9.00 (4.40) 9.05 (4.67) 37 0.03 .973
Brief COPE 5.60 (1.35) 5.50 (1.54) 37 −0.17 .866
PTQ 3.21 (0.86) 2.90 (0.59) 37 −1.45 .156
Follow-
up
TRGI-GG 1.90 (1.06) 0.59 (0.64) 29.33 −4.67 < .001
TRGI-GC 1.55 (0.75) 0.68 (0.33) 24.60 −4.65 < .001
TRGI-D 1.53 (0.96) 0.32 (0.39) 23.51 −5.14 < .001
GG = Global Guilt scale; GC = Guilt Cognition Scale; D = Distress scale.
Figure 1. Changes in guilt-levels (assessed with the PANAS) over time for the blame group n = 19) and the no-blame group
(n = 20). Error bars represent standard errors.
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F(1, 37) = 2.19, p = .147, η2= .05. For the post-manipula-
tion measure, there was a significant difference in guilt
between the blame group (M = 3.26) and the no-blame
group (M = 1.35), F(1, 37) = 28.54, p = < .001, η2= .43.
Further, analyses of simplemain effects indicated that the
increase in guilt between pre-manipulation and post-
manipulation measures was significant for the blame
group, F(1, 37) = 37.28, p = < .001, η2= .50, whereas the
no-blame group did not show a significant increase in
feelings of guilt between pre-manipulation and post-
manipulation measures, F(1, 37) = 0.52, p = .475,
η2= .01. Thus, the manipulation successfully induced
feelings of guilt in the blame group. Besides measuring
feelings of guilt, the PANAS also includes items regard-
ing feelings of shame, distress, and feeling upset.
Analyses of these emotions over time showed similar
patterns as those observed for guilt, but changes in
these feelings were less strong.
2.3. Intrusion frequency and related distress
It was hypothesized that participants in the blame
group would show an increased occurrence of intru-
sions and higher associated distress after the compu-
ter crash compared to participants in the no-blame
group. To examine the link between the incident and
intrusions, only incident-related intrusions were
included for analyses. Selection of incident-related
intrusions was based on descriptions of their content
obtained from the diary. Independent t-tests were
performed to compare the mean number of intru-
sions and associated distress between the two groups.
Results showed that the blame group experienced
significantly more intrusions (M = 2.79, SD = 2.55)
than the no-blame group (M = 0.15, SD = 0.49), t
(19.26) = -4.54, p < .001. Furthermore, the associated
distress of the intrusions was significantly higher in
the blame group (M = 5.91, SD = 3.36) compared to
the no-blame group (M = 0.65, SD = 2.06), t
(29.55) = −5.85, p < .001. Results therefore support
the hypothesis that the blame group would experi-
ence a higher number of intrusions and associated
distress compared to the no-blame group on the day
of the incident (see Figure 2).
In order to test for the effect of guilt-levels on
intrusion frequency and related distress, two univari-
ate ANOVAs with post-manipulation levels of guilt
as independent variable and number of incident-
related intrusions as well as associated distress as
dependent variables were performed. Results showed
a significant effect of guilt-levels on both, incident-
related intrusions F(1, 37) = 5.36, p = .002, η2= .38
and associated distress F(1, 37) = 9.63, p = < .001,
η2= .53. Since the PANAS items ashamed, distressed,
and upset also showed increased scores following the
manipulation, ANOVAs with these emotions as inde-
pendent variables were performed in order to test for
a possible effect on number of incident-related intru-
sions and associated distress. Results indicate that
none of these emotions had a significant effect on
the intrusion frequency of the participants. Shame-
and distress-levels did have a significant effect on the
distress associated with the intrusions, but this effect
was less strong than that of guilt-levels (η2= .28 and
η2= .48 respectively).
To further explore whether the observed effect
was indeed driven by guilt and not other emotions,
shame and distress were independently added as
covariate to the univariate analysis. Results showed
that both shame and distress were no significant
covariates and inclusion of these concepts did not
change the effect of guilt on intrusion frequency or
distress. This indicates that other negative emotions
elicited by the stressor did not account for the effect
on intrusions.
2.4. Additional measure of guilt
To allow for a multidimensional assessment of guilt
in addition to the one-item guilt measure included in
Figure 2. Mean number of intrusions and associated distress on the day of the incident (assessed with the diary) for the blame
group (n = 19) and the no-blame group (n = 20).
*** p < .001.
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the PANAS, the TRGI was used to assess participants’
guilt-levels on the day following the computer crash
(follow-up measure). Independent t-tests were per-
formed to compare scores for the three TRGI scales
(Global Guilt scale, Distress scale, and Guilt
Cognitions scale) between the two groups and results
showed that the blame group scored significantly
higher on all three scales, indicating that they felt
significantly more guilty and distressed in relation
to the computer crash, compared to the no-blame
group (see Table 1). Moreover, all three TRGI scale
scores correlated strongly with post-manipulation
PANAS guilt-scores, with Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficients ranging from r = .70 to r = .79 (all ps < .001).
3. Discussion
The present research aimed to gain insight in the role
of guilt in the development of PTSD by experimen-
tally assessing the influence of stressor-related guilt
on the occurrence of stressor-related intrusions.
Participants experienced a stressor that served as an
analogue for trauma in the form a computer crash
and related loss of data and were either personally
blamed for causing the incident or were told that it
was technical failure and therefore not their fault. We
hypothesized that participants who showed elevated
feelings of guilt after being personally blamed for
causing the computer crash would experience an
increased number of intrusions and higher associated
distress on the day of the incident, compared to the
group that was not personally blamed. Results
showed that the number of intrusions was indeed
significantly higher in the blame group. Moreover,
the intrusions experienced in this group were rated
as significantly more distressing compared to the
intrusions experienced by the no-blame group. The
increase in intrusion frequency and associated dis-
tress could not be explained by increases in other
negative emotions (shame or distress) elicited by the
stressor. Our findings therefore indicate that short-
term induced guilt may contribute to the develop-
ment of PTSD-like phenomena such as intrusive
thoughts at a non-clinical level.
The staged computer crash was designed to pro-
voke a strong perception of personal involvement by
emphasizing participants’ wrongdoing, responsibility,
and preventability in relation to the incident. As
stated above, these factors may crucially influence
the severity of experienced guilt, which can form
the basis of intrusions typical of PTSD. Significantly
higher TRGI Guilt Cognitions scale scores for the
blame group indicate that this goal was achieved,
since this scale assesses perceived violations of perso-
nal and/or moral standards of behaviour, including
responsibility and preventability of the event.
Regarding the changes of guilt-levels over time as
assessed with the PANAS guilt-item, it is noteworthy
that the level of guilt decreased significantly in the
blame group between post-manipulation measure
and follow-up measure, which took place on the day
following the incident. The decrease in guilt-levels for
this group could be explained by acknowledging that
the stressor, which participants experienced in the
form of the computer crash, was not strong enough
to form the basis for prolonged feelings of guilt. Since
the study aimed to investigate the effects of short-
term induced guilt in a sample of healthy partici-
pants, the short-lived nature of heightened guilt-
levels is preferable.
Besides the theoretical implications, clarifying the
directionality of the guilt-PTSD relationship can
help to improve the treatment of PTSD patients.
Even though research points towards a diverse emo-
tional profile underlying PTSD development, the
alleviation of fear remains the main focus of ther-
apeutic interventions (e.g. Shalev, Bonne, & Eth,
1996). Advancement in the understanding of emo-
tional factors that underlie PTSD emphasizes possi-
ble benefits of more idiosyncratic treatment
approaches that aim to change guilt-related feelings
and cognitions associated with the traumatic event.
Such interventions may be especially helpful for
trauma groups that experience high personal invol-
vement and therefore greater levels of guilt and
more severe PTSD symptomatology (e.g. soldiers;
Litz et al., 2009). In this context it needs to be
noted that findings supporting the notion of
increased trauma-related guilt intensifying PTSD
symptomatology do not indicate, in turn, that a
decrease in trauma-related guilt will help alleviate
these symptoms. Further research is necessary to
examine the effects of interventions targeted at
guilt-related feelings and cognitions.
A few limitations should be taken into account for
the present study. First, a non-clinical sample faced a
stressor that served as an analogue for trauma.
Analogue studies conducted in the laboratory, by
definition, include stressors rather than actual trauma
in order to investigate basic psychological principles
that may influence the development of PTSD. Ethical
considerations restrict the manipulation of aversive
states, so naturally participants will never experience
events that are considered traumatic according to
DSM-5 criteria. Still, analogue methods like the
trauma-film paradigm, which involves watching a
film including traumatic events, have proved useful
to study processes involved in trauma (James et al.,
2016). Nevertheless, a critical stance towards the gen-
eralizability of laboratory findings to clinical practice
is of great importance and such studies should aim to
match real-life circumstances and the phenomena
under scrutiny as closely as possible. Here, it can be
debated whether a stressor counts as an analogue of
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trauma or not. The stressor participants faced in the
present study was designed to provoke a strong per-
ception of personal involvement by emphasizing par-
ticipants’ wrongdoing, responsibility, and
preventability of the event in order to make them
feel guilty. Such personal involvement in a traumatic
event may crucially influence the development of
PTSD. We therefore think that the computer crash
and related loss of data which participants experi-
enced served as a suitable analogue for trauma.
Even though the analogue nature of the present
study needs to be considered when interpreting the
results, this novel procedure can help to investigate
psychological mechanisms underlying PTSD.
Second, we used a one-item measure to assess
present-moment guilt in order to test our manip-
ulation, asking: ‘How guilty do you feel right
now?’ Tilghman-Osborne et al. (2010) criticize
such short measures that leave the definition of
guilt to the participant for not clearly delineating
guilt from other related concepts. In our study, a
brief and unobtrusive guilt measure that would
not cause suspicion in the participants was neces-
sary, therefore, the PANAS represented a suitable
option. In addition, a multidimensional assess-
ment of guilt in relation to the incident was con-
ducted with the TRGI and strong correlations with
the PANAS guilt-item affirm its suitability to
assess guilt.
Third, the researcher was not blind for the condi-
tion, which might have strengthened the results in the
hypothesized direction. These effects on the results
might be considered minimal however, as the act of
the researcher being in despair and feeling helpless-
ness followed a standard protocol and interaction
with the participant was avoided as much as possible
to prevent any individual differences in stressor
exposure.
Finally, one issue that complicates a clarification of
the relationship between guilt and PTSD is a lack of
consensus about how guilt relates to and distinguishes
from the theoretical concept of shame (Kubany &
Watson, 2003). Our manipulation aimed to induce
guilt as defined by Tilghman-Osborne et al. (2010)
by letting participants in the blame group believe
that their action (pressing the SHIFT-key) led to a
negative outcome (computer crash and loss of data).
Results indicated that shame showed a similar pattern
to guilt over time as assessed with the PANAS, how-
ever, guilt-levels showed a larger increase than shame-
levels and scores of the TRGI scales confirm that
substantial feelings of guilt in relation the to the com-
puter crash were present in the blame group. Also,
analyses of the effect of both guilt and shame on
intrusion frequency and related distress showed a
stronger effect of guilt that remained significant after
controlling for shame. Thus, shame cannot explain the
increase of number and distress of intrusions observed
in the blame group.
The results of the present study provide valuable
conceptual information about the relationship
between guilt and PTSD. By assessing the influence
of stressor-related guilt on the occurrence of intru-
sions in an experimental study, we found suppor-
tive evidence for the notion that feelings of guilt
may foster PTSD-like phenomena and may there-
fore be part of a causal mechanism that drives the
development of the disorder. Traditionally, PTSD is
understood as an anxiety-based disorder. Clinical
practise however shows that patients with PTSD
experience an array of other negative emotions
besides anxiety, including shame, anger, and guilt.
The findings of this study show that incident-
related guilt predicted increased subsequent PTSD
symptomatology, supporting the potential impor-
tance of focussing on feelings of guilt in the treat-
ment of PTSD.
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